Background:

Georgia and Türkiye have a long shared history, dating back to the Turkish populations

that were spread throughout Georgia following the Ottoman Empire’s centuries-long control of

the Caucasus. Post-independence from the USSR, Türkiye sought to improve relations with

Georgia to counter Russian influence in the South Caucasus. In recent years, relations have grown

to include military and economic development, as Türkiye seeks to strengthen its position in the

South Caucasus by supporting Azerbaijan and enticing Georgia. Türkiye hopes to connect the

Azerbaijani mainland to itself through railways and highways passing through Georgia and has

invested in stronger military ties, conducting regular joint military exercises starting in 2022.[3]

Türkiye is one of Georgia’s largest trading partners and accepts thousands of Georgian laborers

every year, particularly with significant Turkish Foreign Direct Investment in the Adjara region.

Migration from Georgia to Türkiye has been significant, particularly in the 1990s.[11]Türkiye has

increasingly pushed for trilateral cooperation among Georgia, Türkiye, and Azerbaijan, working

to expand Its influence in the Trans-Caucasus region. Türkiye has a clear interest in expanding its

regional influence in both the Levant and Caucasus regions.[12]

While Georgia-Türkiye relations prosper, U.S. relations with the two countries have soured

in recent years, as rule-of-law degradation and closer ties to Russia threaten American interests in

both nations.[4] American relations with Georgia have gone increasingly cold over the lack of

European integration progress and flirtations with Russia.[8] Disagreements on policy in the

Middle East have also strained relations between Türkiye and the US. Disagreements on policy in

the Middle East have also strained relations between Türkiye and the US. [1] However, Türkiye

and Georgia occupy a strategic niche in the Black Sea, providing a wall around Russian-controlled

territory, similar to the role played by NATO-aligned countries in the Baltic Sea. Strengthening

ties in a strategic Black Sea triangle between Türkiye, Georgia, and the US could enhance

cooperation in the region and counter Russian influence in the Black Sea and South Caucasus. The

U.S. needs to implement more significant reforms

to Georgian-Turkish-American relations, particularly regarding Black Sea security. Georgia and

Türkiye are situated in regions of critical importance for both counter-terrorism and countering

Russian aggression. The Caucasus has long been a crossroads of Europe and Asia, with increased

Chinese interest in the region also posing a new challenge to U.S. interests. Strengthening Turkish

Georgian partnerships can lead to a more stable South Caucasus region, creating the conditions for

a more permanent peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and fostering a more pro-Western bloc

within the South Caucasus, a battleground among Russian, Western, Chinese, Iranian, and Turkish

interests. This strategic importance should emphasize the need to strengthen regional ties to ensure

some level of alignment with the US.

 

Creation of a “Black Sea Triangle”

The development of a Black Sea triangle between Türkiye, Georgia, and NATO-aligned

countries such as Romania can mirror the strategy used by NATO in the Baltic Sea, creating a

Western-aligned wall around Russian naval forces. Improving relations with Türkiye is critical toany Black Sea deal due to the Montreux Convention, which allows Türkiye to control the passage

of military ships through the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits. Georgia plays a huge role in the

transport of natural resources from Central and South Asian countries, serving as an alternative

passage to Russia. Many of these goods then travel through the black sea or Turkish territory,

making both countries critical for the development of a “middle passage”. The U.S. must take a

multipronged approach to encourage the development of this strategic triangle. The US should

take an active role in ensuring Black Sea cooperation prevents Türkiye and Georgia from seeking

a Russian alternative such as the 3+3 initiative proposed between Russia, Iran, Türkiye, Georgia,

Armenia, and Azerbaijan.[2]

 

Development of Georgia and an Alternative Energy Pathway

As Russia increasingly wages hybrid warfare against Europe, there is an urgent need to

transition away from Russian energy. Currently, Europe has accomplished this by importing

liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Qatar and the US at much higher costs. Strengthening existing

pipelines and connections from the Caspian Sea region, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)

pipeline,[5] can provide an alternative pathway through the Caucasus and Türkiye to supply

European energy demands. Georgia also possesses significant renewable energy resources, in the

form of wind and hydroelectric energy, producing 81 percent of its energy through renewable

resources.[7] The development of an energy connection between the Caucasus and Türkiye has

been funded by German and Turkish agencies, potentially providing a cheap, clean energy supply

through Turkish-Georgian partnerships. This alternative energy passage reduces European

reliance on Russian energy exports while providing economic benefits to the Caucasus region.

Turkey has been balancing Western and Russian interests on energy for years, trying to position

itself as a regional energy strong hold[15] Corporation with Georgia and the West can reinforce

this position, incentivising Turkish participation in Black Sea corporation.

 

Strengthen Black Sea Maritime Cooperation

The Georgian ports at Batumi and Poti could serve as critical export hubs for trade from

Asia. These ports currently have significant Chinese development, opening the potential for

Chinese seizure through debt-trap diplomacy, as seen in Sri Lanka. The US and Türkiye should

provide an alternative source of development to Chinese BRI funds.[9] These Georgian ports also

offer Western access to the eastern Black Sea region, particularly near Russian bases in Krasnodar

Krai, Sochi, and potentially Abkhazia. Stronger maritime cooperation also puts pressure on Russia

to allow for free maritime passage of Ukrainian ships and can support demining efforts in the Black

Sea region. Strengthening the Organization of the Black Sea Corporation (OBSC), of which

Georgia and Türkiye are both active members, [10] utilizes existing frameworks and treaties,

improving ease of operation. The EU has proposed several plans to expand maritime cooperation

with the end goal of producing a security hub. Eventually integrated into the European market.

[13] This EU Framework is a key step in facilitating the development of the Black Sea region,

with a focus on sustainability, the rule of law, and maintaining the national sovereignty of allnations within the region. The US should embrace the EU’s efforts in facilitating this cooperation,

and take an active role to promote and further this framework.

 

Development of NATO Security Standardization

The prospects of Georgian accession to NATO are low, particularly due to concerns over

territorial integrity. However, as with Ukraine post-2014, training and standardizing the military

to NATO equipment and systems can drastically improveGeorgia’s ability to defend itself. Türkiye

and Romania both have experience with both Soviet and NATO systems, and Türkiye has provided

large numbers of arms to Georgia at a NATO standard. Further Georgian military cooperation with

the U.S., such as that seen during the Global War on Terror, can help train NATO-standard

formations. Increasing the sale of defense equipment, such as the Javelin and Stinger missile

systems, also reinforces Georgia’s defense capabilities and deters Russian aggression in the region.

The EU’s recent expansion of military production could also benefit Turkey and Georgia, with a

huge emphasis on incorporating drones into military use.[14] Georgia can benefit from taking

lessons from the Ukraine war and embracing NATO-style command and control systems.

 

Long-Term EU Accession Progress

Georgian accession to the EU is critical for further economic and political integration into

Europe. Visa-free travel[6] to Europe from Georgia played a large role in boosting the Georgian

economy through academic exchange and remittances and strengthening ties between Georgia and

Europe. EU accession would provide regional stability and increased opportunities for

development. It is also widely backed by the Georgian people. European accession would secure

the Caucasus against Russian, Iranian, or Chinese influence and should serve as the long-term goal

for Georgia, with accession talks restarted and a comprehensive plan formed for both Georgia and

Türkiye. This would require a reversal of democratic backsliding and rectification of territorial

disputes for both nations.

 

South Caucasus Regional Stability

A Georgia-Türkiye-American alliance can work as an intermediary for negotiating the

normalization of relations between Armenia, Türkiye, and Azerbaijan. Georgia has historically

been sympathetic to Azerbaijan but enjoys good relations with both countries. With EU and

American support, Georgia could serve as a key intermediary in negotiating a treaty for increased

stability in the region, undoing decades of Soviet-era “divide and rule” policies. Long-termstability in the South Caucasus reduces the effectiveness of Russian hybrid warfare and improves

the long-term economic and political development of the region.

 

Conclusion

The Black Sea region holds immense strategic importance, serving as a key energy passage

as well as a warm-water port access route for Russia and Central Asia. Shoring up American and

NATO strategic interests in the region can prevent the rise of China as a dominant power while

deterring further Iranian and Russian expansion. The US should work to create a Black Sea triangle

between Georgia, Türkiye, and Black Sea EU nations, linking them in an economic partnership

that provides an alternative pathway away from Russia. Strengthening ties with Türkiye and

Georgia can improve stability in the greater Caucasus region, as well as bring both nations closer

to the West, countering democratic backsliding in the region. Countering Chinese BRI debt-trap

diplomacy serves strategic American goals of containing Chinese influence, particularly in the

realm of energy and critical resource security for NATO and EU members. America, along with

other Western nations, needs to recognize the importance of taking an active role in the Black Sea

region. Abandoning these regions endangers European energy independence while leaving a

critical flank of NATO vulnerable to manipulation. Providing an American-led alternative to

Chinese, Iranian, and Russian influence can help to guide Georgia back on the path to EU and

NATO membership in the future and allow a Western-aligned counter to Russia in the Black Sea

region.

 

References

[1] Ana Almuedo. New turkish foreign policy towards the middle east: Neither so new, nor so

turkish, 2011. Accessed: 2025-06-05.

[2] Emil Avdaliani. 3+3 initiative as a new order in the south caucasus, June 2025. Accessed June

3, 2025.

[3] Civil Georgia. Joint military exercises with Azerbaijan and Türkiye start in Georgia, October

2022. Accessed June 3, 2025.

[4] Council on Foreign Relations. Neither friend nor foe: The Future of U.S.- Türkiye relations,

2025. Accessed June 3, 2025.

[5] Eurasianet. Azerbaijan and Georgia seek to accelerate construction of a black sea power line,

2025. Accessed June 3, 2025.

[6] European External Action Service. European union and the black sea region, 2025. Accessed

June 4, 2025.

[7] IEA. Georgia energy profile – analysis - idea, 2025. Accessed June 3, 2025. 4

[8] Luke Johnson. Georgia’s ruling party tries winning with the Kremlin's Ukraine rhetoric, 2024.

Accessed: 2025-06-05.

[9] Ivan Nechepurenko. Plans for a chinese port in the black sea roil georgia politics - the new york

times. New York Times, March 2025.

[10] Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Member states, 2025. Accessed June 4,

2025.

[11] Tamar Sadunishvili. Georgian Migration to Türkiye between 1990 and 2012, PHD Dissertation

Istanbul Bilgi University,2016

{12] Burak Unveren. Amid Syria's upheaval, how will Türkiye benefit?, 2024.

¨ Accessed: 2025-06-05.

[13] “New EU Strategy for Secure, Prosperous and Resilient Black Sea Region.” EEAS. Accessed

June 5, 2025. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/new-eu-strategy-secure-

prosperous-and-resilient-black-sea-region_en.

[14]JOINT WHITE PAPER for European Defence Readiness 2030 - European Union. Accessed June

5, 2025. https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/30b50d2c-49aa-4250-

9ca6-27a0347cf009_en?filename=White+Paper.pdf.

[15] Maryna Vorotnyuk, “Part 1. Political and Diplomatic Dialogue: Challenges and Opportunities for

Black Sea Cooperation between Turkey and the West in the Post-2022 Environment,” Atlantic

Council, September 16, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-

reports/report/part-1-political-and-diplomatic-dialogue-challenges-and-opportunities-for-black-

sea-cooperation-between-turkey-and-the-west-in-the-post-2022-

environment/?utm

 

 

By Giorgi Mkheidze - the 4th year Bachelor’s student in International Relations and Project Assistant at the Civil Council on Defense and Security

By Kelson Lowrie - graduate of The College of William & Mary where he completed his International Relations studies